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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most difficult task in attempting to analyze and
evaluate a portion of the proposed Federal Securities Code is establishing a proper initial perspective. In an effort to do so, I returned
to the April 1967 issue of The Business Lawyer, which contains the
transcript of the November 1966 proceedings of the Conference on
*Member, New York Bar. Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
A.B., University of Michigan, 1950; LL.B., Harvard University, 1953. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Jeffrey M. Weiner, Esq., in the preparation of this article.
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Codification held in the medieval splendor of Lincoln Hall at the
Northwestern University School of Law.1 Rereading the transcript
of the proceedings was a pleasantly nostalgic reminder of the deep
intellectual stimulation and challenge one experienced when sitting
through those sessions. It also brought back some of the confusion
evident in discussing the proper objectives of a codification program-a subject upon which the participants never seemed to establish complete harmony. On the one hand, mere rewriting of the
law and a straightening out of confusions would not have been worth
the effort. 2 Conversely, codification could not attempt a thoroughgoing revision and rethinking of all problems in the securities laws,
since that would have been an impossible task, tinged with political
dispute and destined for conflict and, probably, failure.'
How then to measure the product? To those who called for a
rethinking of fundamentals, the Code may fall short of the mark.
For example, one commentator thoughtfully outlined the unchartered burgeoning of implied liability under the securities laws and
called for some rationalization.4 Other commentators doubted the
utility of codification, arguing first that the SEC was possessed of
sufficient administrative authority to undertake the necessary simplification and rationalization of the disclosure and registration procedures, and secondly, that a lengthy codification effort would tend
to delay needed thinking about fundamental reform. 5 Perhaps the
golden mean was expressed most aptly by Ralph Demmler, a former
chairman of the SEC, whose remarks illustrated the problem by
cataloguing current interpretive questions under the securities laws
and reviewing the actions of the SEC in dealing with them. He
concluded that:
To me this indicates that something should be done to make it more nearly
possible for a lawyer in general practice to read the statutes and have some
idea what they mean, how to apply them to a particular situation and how to
advise a client so that the client will understand what the lawyer is talking
about. Everything practicable should be done to make the securities laws
better understood because broad public understanding is the most effective aid
to general public obedience of the laws. There lies the public interest in codification.'
1. Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793-925
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Conference on Codification].
2. See, e.g., Remarks of William L. Cary, id. at 908-09.
3. See, e.g., id. at 809-10.
4. Henkel, Codification-CivilLiability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAW. 866 (1967).
5. See Remarks of A. Fleischer, Jr., Conference on Codification,supra, note 1, at 80405; Remarks of Carl W. Schneider, id. at 808-09.
6. Demmler, Codification, 22 Bus. LAW. 832, 834 (1967).
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Perhaps these remarks provide the standard for evaluation of
the success of the ALI Federal Securities Code project. Does it
achieve the expressed objective or does it tend to obscure and
confuse? Does it provide a sounder basis upon which to build the
regulatory structure, or does it provide for the wholesale elimination
of practical solutions and established interpretations that would
require several generations of new decisions and rule evolution to
replace?
A codification project inevitably embodies reform as well. The
draftsman of the Code had a particularly challenging and frustrating assignment, since he was charged with capturing a moving target. The ten years since commencement of the project have been
times of ferment and swift development. Neither the courts, Congress, nor the SEC has delayed or even broken stride in the development of securities law matters and the reporter of the Code has had
the task of reflecting these developments.
The issuer registration and distribution provisions of the Code,
Parts IV and V, while perhaps not the best example of this evolution, illustrate the point. The central concept of the disclosure aspect of the Code, as will be discussed in greater detail below, is the
requirement of registration of companies rather than of securities.
Although procedurally different, this result had been advocated
even prior to the impetus for codification provided by the Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association in 1966. Prior to 1964, lawyers generally viewed the Securities
Act of 19331 as concerned primarily with corporate disclosure in
connection with the distribution of securities by issuers or by controlling persons. The Securities Exchange Act of 19348 was regarded
mainly as a regulatory statute, concerned principally with the trading markets and imposing a more superficial disclosure burden upon
those companies subject to the periodic reporting requirements
applicable prior to 1964. The result was a somewhat accidental pattern of "full disclosure," which was provided only in the case of
companies filing registration statements under the 1933 Act. This
anomaly was visibly apparent and was commented upon by numerous observers, including the Special Study of the Securities Markets,' directed by Milton H. Cohen, and was articulated most force7.

Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act], 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).

8.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-

77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh (1970).
9. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS

OF THE SECURITIES AND

CHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).

Ex-
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fully by Mr. Cohen in a landmark law review article published in
1966.10 The 1964 amendments" extended the full requirements of
the 1934 Act from companies having securities listed and traded on
national securities exchanges to most publicly owned companies
having publicly traded equity securities. 2 Registration under section 12 of the 1934 Act is not company registration as such, but
rather the registration of the equity securities of subject companies.
The distinction, however, is technical only, and is mandated by the
structure of the statute and the lack of authority by the Commission
expressly to require company registration. For practical purposes,
the effect is substantially the same. 13
Thus the provision for company registration in the Code is the
recognition of current reality. In its issuer registration and distribution provisions, the Code completes a process that the Commission
began subsequent to 1964. The dichotomy between the full disclosure responsibilities of the 1933 Act and the less complete disclosure
standards of the 1934 Act became increasingly anomalous. Prodded
10. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
11. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
12. The exceptions are set forth in section 12(g)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(g)(2)
(1970).
13. The concept of company registration, as Professor Loss himself has noted, is not "a
particularly radical idea." Loss & Blackstone, Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
28 Bus. LAw. 381, 383 (1973). Indeed, the origin of the concept of company registration fairly
can be said to lie in the 1934 Act. Aside from so-called "shelf registrations," the basic theory
of the 1933 Act is to register only the actual quantity of securities proposed to be offered. The
1933 Act registration requirement was potentially applicable to any company, but only upon
a public offering. The 1934 Act, on the other hand, required a registration of an entire class
of securities by prohibiting any member, broker, or dealer from effecting a transaction in the
security on a national securities exchange unless the securities were registered with such
exchange. 1934 Act § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. 781(a) (1970). The 1934 Act thus, in effect, imposed an
early form of company registration for issuers desiring to have their securities listed on a
national securities exchange. The 1934 Act registration requirement was not triggered by a
public offering, as was the case under the 1933 Act.
In1938 the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act were extended to cover issuers that
had filed registration statements that became effective pursuant to the 1933 Act. Issuers that
became subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act in this manner, however, were
not subjected thereby to the 1934 Act's registration requirement. Registration under the 1934
Act was not expanded significantly until the Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565. The Amendments added subsection 12(g)(1) to the 1934 Act, which
imposed a registration requirement on companies with 500 or more shareholders and more
than $1,000,000 in total assets.
Significantly, the format of subsection 12(g) (1) did not follow the format of section 12(a)
by prohibiting a broker or dealer from effecting any transaction in the securities of a particular class of an issuer. Subsection 12(g)(1), rather, was directly applicable to every issuer
"engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business affecting interstate commerce, or whose
securities are traded by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce .
...
" Thus this subsection is the father of the Code's company registration requirement.

19771

ISSUER REGISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION

by Milton Cohen's 1966 article and by others, the Commission has
substantially conformed the disclosure requirements of the 1934
Act to the 1933 Act standards. This process culminated in the nowfamiliar catechism that in adopting the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress intended to provide for an integrated and continuous disclosure process for publicly owned corporations.' 4 While this, perhaps,
attributes a hitherto unnoticed perspicacity to Congress, the result
has been healthy and positive. The SEC has achieved real progress
in upgrading the disclosure provisions of the 1934 Act, so that for
all practical purposes they are fundamentally equivalent to 1933 Act
disclosure requirements.' 5
As a result of Commission administrative action, it is not too
much to say that the 1933 and 1934 Acts today do constitute a
continuous disclosure system and that a corporation enters that
system either through an initial public distribution of its securities
or by the mere happenstance of meeting the requirements of shareholder participation and asset size specified in the 1934 Act.'6 Once
entering the system, a company may not depart it unless it satisfies
existing statutory standards that reflect the point at which the public interest no longer requires a corporation to undergo the expense
of public reporting."
How different, then, will life be under the Federal Securities
Code? Will compliance with the Code involve any conceptual or
substantive differences from compliance with today's practices and
requirements? Have the procedures been markedly altered? Are the
liabilities imposed upon participants significantly different? Will
there be significant changes in the substance of the information
provided to investors? What has happened to the level of investor
protection? Is the entire process quicker? Is it cheaper or more
expensive? Are there problems that have not been solved and that
remain to vex? These are some of the important questions toward
which all of the contributions in this Symposium are directed. They
will serve to focus our inquiry, also, as we turn first to the issuer
registration provisions.
14. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2710, at 2907-2
(April 23, 1974).
15. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,156 (Jan. 13, 1977); SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5792, (Dec. 20, 1976); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5791, (Dec.
20, 1976). See generally Heller, "Integration"of the Disseminationof Information Under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
749 (1964).
16. 1934 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
17. 1934 Act § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1970).
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REGISTRATION

Under the Code, the term "registration statement" is used to
refer to a permanent document to be filed by companies entering
into the continuous disclosure process. The Code's "registration
statement" thus provides the starting point for the continuous disclosure system that is the essence of the Code."8
A company may become subject to the registration requirement
in one of three ways. First, a company with at least one million
dollars of total assets and three hundred security holders must file
a registration statement within 120 days after the first fiscal yearend at which it finds itself in this position. 9 Secondly, even if a
company does not meet the assets and security holders criteria, it
is required to file a registration statement if a "distribution"'" of its
securities is made. Thirdly, even if a company is not required to
register under either of the preceding two tests, registration is required as a condition to listing on an exchange. 2' The Code further
states that a company may register at its own option even if not
22
otherwise required to do so.

This basic company registration requirement will not be wholly
unfamiliar to the securities law practitioner. Section 12(g)(1) of the
1934 Act is identified in the Code as a source for the Code's registration provision. The Exchange Act requires the registration of a class
of equity securities if the company's total assets exceed $1,000,000
and the number of its record holders equals or exceeds 500.23 Professor Loss in his Comment states that "[a]ny figures are, of course,
arbitrary."24 The Code's requirement of 300 security holders, Professor Loss goes on to suggest, "seems an appropriate cut-off point for
the assertion of a federal interest to the extent of the registration
and post-registration provisions ....
,,21 Another significant change
in the basic registration criteria is the counting of debt security
holders in arriving at the total. Section 12(g) is limited to holders
18. The term "registration statement" under the 1933 Act has a different purpose. Its
analogue in the Code is the "offering statement." See text accompanying notes 40-43, infra.
19. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 401 (Reporter's Revision of Text of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3,
1974) [hereinafter cited as RD 1-3]. Unless otherwise indicated, all Code section references
are to the Reporter's Revision.
20. RD 1-3 § 402.
21. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 902 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as TD-5].
22. RD 1-3 § 401(d).
23. 1934 Act § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970).
24. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 401, Comment (1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972) [hereinafter cited
as TD-1].
25. Id.

19771

ISSUER REGISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION

of a class of equity securities. As Professor Loss notes, however,
"there seems to be no good reason why registration should not be
required . . . whenever a company with $1,000,000 of assets has a

debt security

. . .

held by as many as 300 persons .... ",2

Section 403 of the Code provides that "[a] registration statement shall contain whatever information, financial statements,
material contracts and other documents the Commission specifies
by rule. 27 This complete legislative delegation to the Commission,
in Professor Loss's view, "seems perfectly safe in the year 1972."2
One need not criticize the Commission's competence in the disclosure area, however, to suggest that after some 35 years of experience
with the securities laws a statute prescribing the basic disclosure
items (similar to the 1933 Act's Schedule A) should be possible, as
well as appropriate and desirable. 9 The wisdom of leaving the entire
job to the Commission may be questioned. The contents of the
Code's "offering statement" and "prospectus" also are left entirely
to the Commission. 31 While conceding that the Commission has
experience in devising disclosure requirements, and that the burdens imposed on registrants have generally been reasonable, clearer
legislative guidelines to provide standards against which the Commission's requirements may be measured would seem appropriate.
Doubts about the utility of increased disclosure have been expressed, 3 ' and the SEC has appointed a distinguished Advisory
Committee to consider the role and appropriate scope of disclosure.3 2 Further study of this issue hopefully will permit more authoritative guidance regarding the form of disclosure that best suits the
needs of investors. This minor observation is perhaps illustrative of
a broader concern that undoubtedly will be debated elsewhere in
this Symposium-namely, whether the Code is unduly generous
and sanguine in its delegation to the Commission of unresolved
issues and problems. Instances of such delegation are frequent, and,
on balance, seem to confer rather broader power on the Commission
than it presently enjoys.
26. Id.
27. RD 1-3 § 403.
28. TD-1 § 403, Comment (1).
29. 1933 Act Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa Schedule A (1970).
30. See text accompanying notes 67-77, infra.
31. See, e.g., Benston, Required Disclosureand the Stock Market: An Evaluationof the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973). A different view was taken
in Friend & Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: A Comment, 64 Am.
EcoN. Rv.467 (1975). The debate was continued in Benston, Required Disclosure and the
Stock Market: Rejoinder, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 473 (1975).
32. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5673 (Feb. 2, 1976).
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The Commission's plenary power to determine the contents of
the registration statement renders impossible any prediction of its
form or content. One can presume that it will resemble closely the
Form 10 registration statement presently required under section
12(g) of the 1934 Act. The Code evidently contemplates that each
company subject to registration will file a registration statement
even if presently subject to the 1934 Act reporting requirements.
The Commission should consider permitting companies to elect to
adopt their most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K, or its equivalent, as their Code registration statement, thereby avoiding unnecessary paperwork and expense that would otherwise be involved in
the transition to the Code system. If the Form 10-K is no longer
reasonably current, a simple updating procedure would seem to
suffice.
The Code provides that a registration statement becomes effective on the thirtieth day after filing of the registration statement or
the last pre-effective amendment thereto. 33 Effectiveness is prevented automatically if a proceeding is pending under section
the termination and with1506(d) .3 Additional provisions regulate
3
drawal of registration statements .
Once a company becomes a "registrant" by filing a registration
statement, the company is subject to the continuous disclosure reporting requirements of Part VI of the Code for so long as such
registration statement remains effective. The Code makes no provision for amending or updating the registration statement on a current basis. 36 It is not an offering document for the sale of securities
that must be kept current by subsequent filings. Current information for the use of investors will be provided by an "offering" or
"distribution" statement and by the reporting and disclosure requirements of Part VI of the Code, which contains the postregistration provisions, discussed elsewhere in this Symposium.
Our discussion of the post-registration provisions of Part VI will
be limited to that which is necessary to complete our analysis of the
issuer registration provisions of Part IV. Section 601 in general
terms authorizes the Commission to require registrants to make
whatever reports it deems necessary "to keep reasonably current the
33. RD 1-3 § 404.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 405.
36. Although the registration statement will not be updated on a current basis, its
information will be revised and collected in one document periodically. See text accompanying notes 37-39.
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information and documents contained in the registration statement
or to keep investors reasonably informed with respect to the registrant. '3 In a Comment to this section, Professor Loss makes the
following statement:
It is contemplated that the Commission, with due regard to the burdens
involved in the case of relatively small registrants particularly, will require the
annual report at specified intervals to integrate the last previous registration
statement and all subsequent reports.38

Thus a registrant's initial registration statement will survive only
39
until the filing of its first "integrated" annual report.
III.

A.

DISTRIBUTIONS

Definition of Distribution

The Code's system of permanent company registration and continuous disclosure has not dispensed with the need for a prospectus
upon what Milton Cohen so felicitously has called the "special occasion" of a public offering. The Code "proceeds on the theory that
there is still a role for some sort of special filing (the 'offering statement'), as well as the delivery of a prospectus, when there is a
substantial distribution, with the extra selling pressure that is entailed."4 In this respect the Code preserves the procedures familiar
to lawyers and investment bankers engaged in securities distributions.
Section 501 of the Code, which relates to offerings by an issuer
(primary distributions), provides:
Except when section 509 applies . . .it is unlawful for any person in

connection with a distribution by him or resulting from his offer (or for an
underwriter, broker, or dealer in connection with a distribution by any person)
to offer a security, or for a broker or dealer to offer to buy a security from an
underwriter in connection with a distribution by or through the underwriter,
(1) unless the issuer has filed an offering statement with respect to the distribution (either as a separate document if it is already a registrant or as part of
its registration statement under section 402 if it is not), or (2) while an offering
statement with respect to the distribution is the subject of a stop order under
section 1506(d) or (before its effectiveness) a public proceeding under that
section or a public investigation under section 1505(d)(1). 1
37. RD 1-3 § 601.
38. TD-1 § 601, Comment (1)(b).
39. The reference in the Comment to the "last previous registration statement" is a
minor oversight, which undoubtedly will be corrected in the final draft. Under the Code, every
registrant will file one and only one registration statement. Indeed, a specific Code provision
prohibits the Commission from requiring the filing of more than one registration statement
by a registrant. RD 1-3 § 289(b).
40. TD-1 at xxi.
41. RD 1-3 § 501(a).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:327

This structure will be recognized as a version of section 5(c) of the
1933 Act, which requires the filing of a registration statement before
an offer can be made to purchase or sell a security. The Code's
offering statement is thus the equivalent of the 1933 Act registration
statement. Section 509 of the Code provides for somewhat different
provisions in the case of secondary distributions. In the case of a
secondary distribution of the securities of a one-year registrant, the
offering document is called a "distribution statement."
At this point the conceptual similarities between the Code and
present law diverge. First, the concept of "control" is abandoned
and secondly, the determinant for the application of sections 501 or
509, which require the filing of an offering or distribution statement
and the use and delivery of a prospectus, is whether a "distribution"
is involved. Present law does not define the term "distribution,"
which has developed an impressive administrative and judicial superstructure.4 2 The Code, however, does. A distribution is "an offering other than a limited offering or a trading transaction.", 3 "Offering," "limited offering" and "trading transaction" are terms of art
in the Code that must be considered separately.
(1)

"Offering"

The use of the word "offering" rather than the perhaps more
natural choice of "offer," is deliberate and is intended to serve two
functions. First, the term "offering" is used rather than the term
"issue" because the former applies to secondary as well as to primary offerings.4" Secondly, the term is used to "make clear when the
integration concept is to be applied."4 5 Thus offering is defined in
the Code as follows:
"Offering" is used in the sense that (1) offers of securities of different
classes are separate offerings, and (2) offers of securities of the same class by
or for the account or benefit of the same person (whether the issuer or any
person) are separate offerings only if they are substantially distinct on the
basis of such factors as the manner, time, and purpose of the offerings, the
offering price, and the kind of consideration."
42. E.g., Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,844 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 1977); 17 C.F.R. § 230.140 (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976); see
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITES REGULATION 351-467 (3d ed. 1972).
43. RD 1-3 § 227(a).
44. TD-1 at xxiii.
45. Id. § 267, Comment.
46. RD 1-3 § 267.
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(2)

"Limited Offering"

The definition of distribution excludes "offerings" that are limited offerings. A limited offering is one that meets the following
conditions:
(1) The initial buyers are either "institutional investors"4 7 or
thirty-five or fewer other persons, or both;
(2) Resales to persons other than institutional investors
within three years" after the last sale to any of the initial buyers
other than institutional investors do not result in more than thirtyfive owners (excluding institutional investors and persons who become owners otherwise than by purchase) at any one time, unless
the resales are pursuant to an offering statement,4 9 a distribution
statement," or an exemption; and
(3) The original offeror or resellers comply with any rules
adopted by the Commission relating to stock transfer restrictions.
As with other provisions of the Code, the proposed statute cannot provide a clear picture of the ultimate contours of the limited
offering. This is a necessary concomitant of the Commission's power
under the Code to "modify" the above conditions or to "impose
additional conditions, considering (among other criteria) (A)
whether the issuer is a one-year registrant, (B) the type of issuer and
security, and (C) the kind of market if any."51
The limited offering is, of course, the Code's answer to the
confusion caused by judicial interpretations of the statutory private
offering exemption of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act.52 Whether the
limited offering provides an adequate answer is a separate question. It constitutes a significant loosening of the requirements of
current law. More importantly, a much needed and welcome degree
of certainty will be brought to an area of the law about which one
leading and experienced practitioner has made the following observations:
47. "Institutional investor" is defined in the Code to include a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, or parent of any such person. The Commission, however, is given very broad authority to enlarge, to contract, and otherwise to define precisely
the term. RD 1-3 § 242.
48. The period is one year, instead of three years, if the issuer is a one-year registrant
at the time of the particular resale. RD 1-3 § 227(b)(2).
49. See text accompanying notes 58-62 infra.
50. See text accompanying notes 102-109 infra.
51. RD 1-3 § 227(b)(3).
52. See Section 4(2) and Statutory Law-A PositionPaper of the Federal Regulation
of Securities Committee, 31 Bus. LAW. 485 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA Committee].

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:327

It would be satisfying to be able to say that §4(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 creating the private offering was born in sin, but it is probably fair only
to say that it was not the child of much careful thought and planning. From
the date of its birth, there has been uncertainty
and controversy over why it
53
was born and what it was supposed to do.

Since June 10, 1974, a company seeking to raise money privately on the basis of the private offering exemption from registration under the 1933 Act has had two options availabile. First, under
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, a company safely may ignore the registration requirement of section 5 of the Act in connection with the
sale of its securities, provided that the transaction is one "not involving any public offering." As all experienced corporate practitioners know, the extensive confusion surrounding the interpretation of the statutory language has rendered the availability of the
exemption uncertain in all but the clearest cases. 4
Partially in response to the perceived need for greater certainty
in the area of private offerings, the Commission in 1974 promulgated
rule 146.11 Compliance with the rather stringent requirements of the
rule provides an alternative avenue for effecting a private offering.
So much has been written on section 4(2) and rule 146 that no useful
purpose would be served by adding to the literature. Moreover,
Professor Loss already has provided us with a comparison of the
Code's limited offering and the 1933 Act's private offering. 6 Nevertheless, section 227(b)(3) appears to be sufficiently broadly written
to permit the Commission, if the Code is enacted, to repromulgate
rule 146 in its entirety. Although such action by the Commission
would be theoretically possible, giving the wording of section 227
(b)(3), it would be wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the Code's
welcome clarification and simplification of the law in this area.
(3)

"Trading Transaction"

To complete the journey through the Code's sections for the
purpose of defining a distribution, the definition of a trading transaction must be considered. A trading transaction is (a) a transaction
through a broker or with or by a dealer (b) that meets the following
conditions:
53.

Garrett, The Private Offering Exemption Today, in PLI FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
9 (1973).

ON SECURITIES REGULATION

54. See ABA Committee, supra note 51.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976).
56. Loss, The "Limited Offering" under the American Law Institute's FederalSecurities Code, in PLI FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcURrTIEs REGULATION 23 (1973).
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(1) The transaction is not by or for the account or benefit
of the issuer;
(2) The security was not the subject of a limited offering
within a specified time period;
(3) The broker or dealer performs no more than his usual
function;
(4) The broker or dealer receives no unusual compensation; and
(5) The total of all trading transactions originating with or
for the account of the same person during a specified period does
not exceed an amount to be specified by the Commission by
rule. 57
Thus all trading transactions, whether or not for the account of a
"control" person, can be executed freely without the use of a prospectus.
B.

ProhibitedActivities

Section 501 prohibits three types of activities "unless the issuer
has filed an offering statement with respect to the distribution."
First, it is unlawful for any person in connection with a distribution
by him or resulting from his offer to offer a security. The purpose of
the limiting words "by him or resulting from his offer" is twofold.
The language is intended "to avoid any inference that an ordinary
resale of a security covered by an offering statement (a resale that
is not itself a 'distribution') would be 'in connection with' the distribution covered by the offering statement."5 8 The second reason for
the limiting language is "to assure, conversely, that the section does
apply to the buyer in a 'limited offering' whose improper resales
result in a distribution." 9
The second type of activity prohibited by Section 501 unless an
"offering statement" is on file is an offer of a security by an underwriter, broker or dealer in connection with a distribution by any
person. As a third proscription, unless an offering statement is on
file it is unlawful for a broker or dealer to offer to buy a security from
an underwriter in connection with a distribution by or through the
underwriter.
These three prohibitions, whose provisions are the equivalent
of current section 5(c) of the 1933 Act, do not apply in the case of
57.
58.

RD 1-3 § 227(c).
TD-1 § 501(a), Comment 2.

59. Id.
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"a transaction incident to an offer or sale to an underwriter."" This

exemption is necessary to allow the issuer to negotiate with the
underwriting group during the prefiling period. The Code provision
differs from its 1933 Act counterpart81 in that the latter provides for
the exemption by means of an exception from the definitions of
"offer" and "sale," while the Code's exemption is transactional. Not
only does the Code's formulation result in greater clarity, but, more
importantly, it affords the underwriter as a buyer the benefit of the
Code's antifraud provisions. 2
The Code apparently does not contemplate any significant
change in the duties or practices of underwriters and other participants in distributions. The stabilization rules in rule 10b-713 are
carried forward in section 1309 of the Code. The reporter's Comment
indicates that no substantial change is contemplated and, as is the
case with other provisions, leaves the detail to Commission rule. 4
The same situation would seem to prevail regarding rules 10b-211
and 10b-68 which, generally speaking, govern the permitted activities of issuers, underwriters, and prospective underwriters who are
participating or have agreed to participate in a distribution. Section
1308(d) of the Code simplifies and codifies the fundamental prohibitions presently found in rules 10b-2 and 10b-6, but does not codify
the related exemptions in rule 10b-6. Thus the Code leaves to Commission rulemaking the exemption of conduct necessary to permit
an underwriter to recommend the actual securities being distributed. The Comment indicates the Code's assumption that the Commission will adopt the traditional exemptions. We therefore can
assume that the Commission will re-enact by regulation the existing
provisions of rule 10b-6, but that event must await the ultimate
preparation of rules under the Code. This approach seems undesirable in the case of the present rule 10b-6 situations, since the exemption in the rule seems to be an integral part of the regulation, and
without the exemption the entire process of distributing securities
simply will not work. It thus would seem advisable that the Code
actually incorporate the more important exceptions presently contained in rule 10b-6, many of which are so fundamental that they
are deserving of legislative recognition.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

RD 1-3 § 511(a).
1933 Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970).
TD-1 § 511(a), Comment.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1976).
TD-2 § 1309, Comment (1).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-2 (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1976).
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The content of the offering statement, like that of the registration statement, is left to the Commission to specify by rule.67 Unless
an administrative proceeding is pending with respect to an offering
statement, it becomes effective on the thirtieth day after filing of
the statement or the last pre-effective amendment," subject to the
Code's provisions for acceleration in section 1702(b).
C.

Communicationof the Offer

After an offering statement has been filed, the Code in section
502 provides the following six methods by means of which offers
may be communicated:
(1) Orally;
(2) by a "prospectus";
(3) by a "summary prospectus";
(4) by a "preliminary prospectus" (before effectiveness only);
(5) by a writing that states from whom the prospectus, a summary prospectus, or a preliminary prospectus may be obtained
and in addition does no more than state by whom orders will be
executed and whatever other information the Commission permits by rule; or
(6) by any writing provided that it is accompanied or preceded
by a prospectus current when the writing is used (after effectiveness only).
In setting forth in one place all the permissible methods of making
offers from before filing until after effectiveness, section 502 of the
Code represents an effort to clarify the procedures currently permitted under section 5(b)(1) of the 1933 Act and its related definition
of "prospectus." 9 This formulation replaces the present system,
which depends to a large degree on an expanded definition of the
term "prospectus." The "concept of a 'prospectus' under the present § 2(10) as any written offer will be no more."7 The Code's
prospectus refers only to that document which contains so much of
the registration statement and offering statement as the Commission may require.7 ' Its content again is left to the Commission to
prescribe by rule.7" The Code requires only that the document be
67.

RD 1-3 § 501(c).

68. Id. § 501(d).
69.

1933 Act § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970).

70. TD-1 § 502, Comment (3).
71.
72.

RD 1-3 § 504(a).
Id. § 504(b).
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"current at the time of its use" 73 and specifically authorizes the
Commission to permit the omission of "price, underwriting, and
related information."74 The content of the "summary prospectus"
contemplated by the Code also is left to the discretion of the Commission.75 It may omit in part or summarize information in the
prospectus, 7 but it must be current
prospectus or the preliminary
77
at the time of its use.
D.

Confirmation and Disaffirmance

(1) Confirmation of Sale
Like its 1933 Act counterpart, 7 section 503(a)(1) of the Code
makes it unlawful "to sell or confirm a sale of a security, deliver a
security after sale, or accept payment for a security, unless an offering statement is in effect with respect to the distribution." The Code
introduces a rather puzzling wrinkle regarding the confirmation of
sales of securities. Section 503(a)(2) prohibits confirmation of a sale
of a security, unless the buyer "has received a prospectus or preliminary prospectus not later than receipt of the confirmation." Subsection (a)(3) prohibits delivery of a security after sale or acceptance
of payment for a security unless the buyer "has received a prospectus not later than receipt of the security or acceptance of payment,
whichever first occurs." The net effect of these provisions appears
to be that a sale may be confirmed on the basis of a preliminary
prospectus but a security may not be delivered after a sale nor
payment for a security accepted unless the buyer has received a
final prospectus. Present law forbids confirmation of a sale using
jurisdictional means without the final prospectus accompanying or
preceding the confirmation (unless the unusual circumstances of
rule 431 are present).7 The reporter's Comment suggests that the
Code's formulation is "designed to solve the 'California problem'-which is to say, the difficulty of getting prospectuses in time
:"0 The utility of the Code's solution is somewhat difficult to
see, since the final prospectus nevertheless must be delivered before
payment may be accepted. Presumably, if the preliminary prospec73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 277.
Id. § 504(b).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 299.8.
1933 Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. 77e(a)(1970).
1933 Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. 77e(b)(1970).
TD-1 § 503(a), Comment (1).
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tus varies in any material way from the final prospectus, or is otherwise incomplete, the legal significance of enclosing it with the confirmation is unclear.
The legal effect of the confirmation has been the subject of
doubt and discussion among securities lawyers. When the broker is
acting as a principal and sells to his customer from his inventory,
the buyer is bound under section 8-319 of the Uniform Commercial
Code by a legal contract as a result of receipt of the confirmation,
unless he denies the existence of the contract or disputes its terms
within the period of time specified in the Uniform Commercial Code
as adopted in a particular state. 81 When the broker acts as agent for
his customer, however, as is usually the case, the relationship does
not involve a "contract for the sale of securities," and section 8-319
does not apply. Despite the more than forty years of operating under
the Securities Act of 1933, the legal effect of such a confirmation has
never been determined authoritatively by the courts.
(2)

Disaffirmance of Purchase

In addition to the rather limited right provided by the Uniform
Commercial Code to avoid the purchase of a security in certain
cases, the Federal Securities Code would provide every buyer with
a "privilege of disaffirmance" if the issuer is not a "one-year registrant" at the time of the sale."2 In such cases "and in other cases in
81. New York, for example, which has adopted without change the 1962 Official Text
of the Uniform Commercial Code, permits the buyer to object to "its contents" at any time
within 10 days after receipt of the written confirmation. N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-319(c) (62-1/2
McKinney). Thus, upon receipt of a written confirmation relating to a purported sale of
securities by the seller to the buyer, the buyer has 10 days within which to notify the seller if
he either denies the existence of any contract or disputes the terms stated in the confirmation.
See Lehman Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). With respect to an objection on the former ground, U.C.C. § 8319 does not provide an automatic 10-day right of rescission, but rather a means by which a
buyer who received such a confirmation, either by mistake or under a dispute between the
buyer and seller regarding whether the buyer had in fact agreed to buy, can register effectively
his protest. Thus, as one court has noted, "[ilt is not the purpose of Section 8-319(c) to give
a purchaser of stock through a broker a period of ten days in which to repent of his purchase
if the market goes down." DiJulio v. Digicon, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (D. Md. 1972).
If no objection is made by the buyer within the 10-day period, then the confirmation,
although not itself a "contract," will be treated under the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds rule in
section 8-319 as acceptable evidence of the existence of a contract on the terms contained
therein. Moreover, if the confirmation "contains all of the essential elements of a contract,
rather than being merely a skeleton memorandum, it should be treated as conclusive evidence
of the existence of the contract, subject to attack only on the grounds on which a written
contract may be attacked." Shpilberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 579, 583 (Ky. 1976).
82. RD 1-3 § 503(b).
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which the Commission provides by rule or order, a sale ... is not
binding on the buyer if he proves that notice of disaffirmance was
delivered to the seller's business address not later than five o'clock
in the afternoon . . .of the second full business day after the
buyer's receipt of a prospectus and notice of his right under this
subsection."" This right of disaffirmance does not apply if the seller
proves that a prospectus or preliminary prospectus current at the
time of the sale was given to the buyer or delivered at his address
not later than the second full business day before the sale."4 The
period for receipt of the notice of disaffirmance is reduced to the first
instead of the second business day if the seller proves that the prospectus or preliminary prospectus (current at the time of sale) was
given or delivered not later than the first full business day before
the sale. 8 Thus, unlike section 8-319 of the U.C.C., section 503(b)
would give the buyer, under limited circumstances, an absolute
right to rescind his purchase, based presumably upon second
thoughts induced by reading the prospectus.
The privilege of disaffirmance provided in the Code may be
compared with the Commission's present policy of not accelerating
the effectiveness of a new registrant's registration statement unless
assurances have been received that copies of the preliminary prospectus will be sent to customers at least forty-eight hours prior to
mailing of the confirmations. 6 With respect to existing as well as
new registrants, rule 15c2-8 under the 1934 Act requires managing
underwriters and dealers to take certain prescribed reasonable steps
designed to assure that preliminary and final prospectuses are made
available to customers who have been or are to be solicited to purchase the securities being distributed. Thus, the Commission, by
rulemaking and accelerating policy, substantially has anticipated
the requirement of the Code, albeit in a complex and circuitous way.
The Code's direct handling of offering procedures, however, seems
preferable.
E. The Prospectus Requirement
As earlier suggested, the principal conceptual innovation in the
Code's handling, of distributions is in the elimination of the control
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Measuring the two-day period from delivery of a current preliminary prospectus
is somewhat confusing, since the preliminary prospectus is unlikely to be complete in all
respects and the integration of this provision with the Uniform Commercial Code is unclear.
86. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4968 (April 24, 1969).
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test with respect to whether secondary distributions must be registered. Aside from this basic conceptual change, the Code offering
statement process is essentially the same as the 1933 Act's registration process. The 1933 Act's fundamental idea of providing advance
notice of an offering of securities and of requiring the delivery of a
prospectus to the purchaser has survived intact, but is rendered
somewhat more simple and workable by the Code.
The prospectus delivery requirements of the 1933 Act have been
subjected to criticism almost since the adoption of the statute in
1933.87 Critics have complained that the prospectus often was received by the investor "as a momento of the transaction" and did
not serve its purpose of assisting in formulating investment decisions. As the disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act became integrated more currently with 1933 Act disclosures, the Commission
adopted a series of rules that dispense with the prospectus delivery
requirement in various circumstances. 8 In addition, recognition of
the increasing amount of continuous disclosure required of reporting
companies has permitted the Commission over the years to reduce
the information required to be disclosed in a public offering of the
securities of a reporting company. This process has culminated in
the most recent requirements for the contents of Form S-16 and the
current proposal for further relaxation of the utilization of that form
in connection with the proposed adoption of Form S-14A.8 ' The SEC
Advisory Committee on Disclosure is continuing to study the entire
question of prospectus delivery, and proposals for further simplification of the process are expected. The Code provides for incorporation of this streamlining by simply providing that prospectuses
shall include whatever information the SEC decides should be included.'"
The Code, quite properly, does not enter the thicket of the
current debate over the utility of retaining a prospectus delivery
requirement. This issue has been posed squarely by Professor
Homer Kripke in a recent article:
87. See, e.g., Cohen, supranote 10; Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus.
LAw. 631 (1973); Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1151 (1970); Mann, Prospectuses: UnreadableorJust Unread?A Proposal to
Reexamine PoliciesAgainst PermittingProjections,40 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 222, 225-27 (1971).
88. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (1976).
89. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5792 (Dec. 20, 1976); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5791 (Dec. 20, 1976).
90. Section 504 provides that the Commission by rule shall specify how much of the
contents of the registration statement and offering statement shall be included in a prospectus.
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It is time to consider whether or not the 1933 Act, with its emphasis on the
prospectus delivered to the prospective purchaser, is necessary and serves any
purpose. This is particularly so in the case of a secondary distribution, in which
price will in any event be determined by the existing market. Even on primary
distributions where there will be some change in the capital structure and
perhaps in the business of the issuer, there is a question as to whether or not
the tension and the extensive prospectus effort of the Securities Act is needed
in communicating the new facts to the prospective decision makers."

Professor Loss has stated simply that the Code "proceeds on the
theory that there is still a role for some sort of special filing ... ,
as well as the delivery of a prospectus, when there is a substantial
distribution, with the extra selling pressure that is entailed."9 2 The
writer is in general agreement with Professor Loss's observation.

Notwithstanding the existence in the Commission's files of current
information regarding an issuer, the distribution process still needs
some type of offering document that (a) informs the securities markets of a coming distribution, (b) provides vital information with
respect to the size of the offering, impact on the issuer's capitalization, if any, and describes proposed underwriting arrangements, and
(c) provides in readable form the current information regarding the
issuer not already provided in previous filings. The author also sees
some utility in providing a reasonably concise summary of the company's business as well as a reference to sources of more detailed
information. The Code is structured to permit such an approach.
This approach also would coincide most nearly with the preference
of underwriters and dealers in organizing a selling syndicate and in
soliciting investors to purchase the distributed securities. Particularly in the case of conventional equity offerings, a solicitation period normally still is required, and investors as well as underwriters
and dealers are likely to feel more comfortable with some type of
summary selling document.
IV.

SEcONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS

A.

Introduction

Under current law, the questions of when and how a stockholder
may sell all or some of his securities depend in large part upon his
relationship to the issuer and the manner in which he acquired the
securities. Thus, if the seller is not in a control relationship 3 with
91. Kripke, An Unusual Opportunity For Rethinking Concepts on a Fundamental
Level, N.Y.L.J. December 13, 1976, at 27, 37.
92. TD-1 at xxi.

93. The 1933 Act exempts from registration "transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter or dealer." 1933 Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1) (1970).
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the issuer and is not a statutory underwriter,94 then he is free to sell
any amount of securities in any manner." If the seller, although not
in a control relationship with the issuer, acquired the securities in
a private offering, his ability to resell freely without the necessity
of registration depends on compliance with rule 144 or otherwise
demonstrating the availability of an exemption from section 5.11 If
the seller is in a control relationship with the issuer, however, then
regardless of whether the securities he proposes to sell were acquired
in the open market from another stockholder or from the issuer in
an exempt offering, he is limited to (1) selling all or a portion of his
holdings in a manner not involving a "distribution" (as the term is
used in the 1933 Act), thereby qualifying for an exemption pursuant
to section 4(1),11 or (2) selling the quantity specified in rule 144
provided the other requirements of the rule are met.
Under the Code, the seller's relationship to the issuer is irrelevant. Only the amount and the manner of the offering are important. As Professor Loss put it, "[a]ll distributions, whether primary or secondary, are treated alike in that they are covered prima
facie."." As will be seen, however, the Code does recognize the inherent differences between a primary offering by an issuer and a secondary offering by a stockholder.
B. Alternatives for Stockholders Selling Under the Code
The Code provides a stockholder with six ways by which to
dispose of his securities. If the offering does not exceed 100,000
dollars, then an exemption from the offering statement requirement
may be available." Even if the amount is more than 100,000 dollars,
94. The selling shareholder himself would be deemed an "underwriter" if he purchased
the shares from the issuer in an exempt offering with the intent to resell them. 1933 Act §
2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
95. This statement has been qualified somewhat by a series of no-action letters in which
the staff of the Commission has taken the position that a proposed secondary offering may
involve a "distribution" simply by reason of the quantity of shares proposed to be sold,
regardless of whether the proposed seller is in a control relationship with the issuer or is a
statutory underwriter. E.g., International Foodservice Corp., 1933 Act § 2(11), available
March 1, 1976. This administrative position, though without doctrinal foundation in the 1933
Act, apparently represents an administrative trade-off in determining whether a proposed
seller may be a control person. The Commission traditionally has not been willing to take
positions on the latter subject, and the staff position regarding distributions under these
circumstances has been, generally speaking, that no enforcement action would be recommended against such a distribution if it were conducted substantially in compliance with the
rule 144 limitations on volume and method of sale.
96. 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRiCTED SEcurrIEs § 7.3 (1976 Rev.).
97. The transaction then would be one not involving an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.
98. TD-1 at xxiv.
99. RD 1-3 § 511(d); see text accompanying note 121 infra.
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the selling stockholder may be able to achieve his purpose through
the limited offering exemption.' 0 He also may be able to dispose of
his securities through "trading transactions.""' If none of the
foregoing methods is satisfactory or available, then the stockholder
will be unable to dispose of his holdings without making some kind
of filing. If the stockholder has the protection of a registration covenant, he only need make the appropriate demand upon the issuer.
Under current law, the stockholder who could not avail himself of
any of the four preceding alternatives would be "locked in."
The Code, however, provides two new methods by which a
stockholder may dispose of his securities. If the issuer has been a
registrant for at least one year (a "one-year registrant") and the
security was not the subject of a limited offering during the one-year
period specified in section 227(b)(2), then, as a fifth method of
disposition, the stockholder may sell his securities pursuant to a
"distribution statement."'' 0 As Professor Loss rightly observes,
"[tihis is a radically new treatment of secondary distributions. ... "" Section 509 provides a mini-registration procedure.
In effect, the distribution statement is like a registration statement
on Form S-16, except that it is filed by the selling stockholder and
does not require the issuer's consent. The sixth alternative of a
shareholder is to compel registration by demand upon the issuer
under section 501. This provision, as discussed below, provides the
"locked-in" shareholder of an issuer which is not a one-year registrant with a way to sell his securities on the public market.
(1)

The Distribution Statement

Under section 509(b), unless the distributor has filed a distribution statement, it is unlawful for any person in connection with a
secondary distribution (including underwriters, brokers, and dealers) to offer, sell, or confirm a sale of a security, to deliver a security
after sale, to accept payment for a security, or for a broker or dealer
to offer to buy a security from an underwriter in connection with the
secondary distribution. Thus a distribution statement may be filed
by the selling stockholder and does not require the issuer's cooperation.
The distribution statement apparently becomes "effective"
immediately upon filing, since at this point completion of a sale no
100.
101.
102.
103.

See text accompanying notes 47-56 supra.
See text accompanying note 57 supra.
RD 1-3 § 509.
TD-1 § 509, Comment (1).
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longer is prohibited.' 4 The offering statement becomes effective on
the thirtieth day after its filing. The desirability of providing for the
immediate effectiveness of a distribution statement may be questioned, since it would permit the distribution of a potentially large
amount of securities without giving the market the chance to receive
the information of a prospective offering and to evaluate its impact.
This presents the policy question whether the market is entitled to
any such notice. The answer may lie in the practical determination
of the necessity for underwriters to undertake an offering period in
order to successfully place the issue. Nevertheless, this question
merits some further consideration.
The Code contemplates that the distribution statement will be
a relatively simple document, containing whatever information the
Commission requires by rule, but limited to information concerning
the secondary distributor and the terms of the distribution.' 5 The
distribution statement must identify the most recent annual report
and subsequent reports, but such reports need not be attached physically unless the issuer had less than 100,000 dollars of total assets
and 1,000 holders of its securities as of its last two preceding fiscal
year-ends, and if the Commission so requires by rule.' °8 The distribution statement may contain additional information and must
contain a certification by the secondary distributor that he is not
aware of additional information that should be disclosed. 07 Thus,
as Professor Loss notes, except for secondary distributions of securities of very small issuers, "all the required information might well
appear on the confirmation."' 0'1
The distribution statement must be used in connection with
written offers, and it is unlawful to confirm a sale of a security, to
deliver a security after sale, or to accept payment for a security,
unless the buyer has received a distribution statement not later
than whichever of the foregoing events first occurs. The entire distri104.

The apparently immediate effectiveness of the distribution statement is inconsist-

ent with section 509(h), which provides that a distribution statement speaks as of its filing
date unless an amendment has been filed. In that event it speaks as of the filing date of the
distribution statement "until the amendment becomes effective and thereafter as of the
effective date of the amendment." This would imply that a distribution statement amendment must be declared effective, an unusual implication since the statute provides no procedure by which the distribution statement itself is declared effective. The provision contemplating that an amendment to a distribution statement must be declared effective is a minor
inconsistency that undoubtedly will be corrected.
105. RD 1-3 § 509(e).
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
TD-1 § 509, Comment (2).
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bution statement, however, need not be delivered but only those
portions that the Commission specifies by rule."0 9 The privilege of
disaffirmance provided in section 503(b) is not available in the case
of secondary distributions, since as previously noted that privilege
is available only in cases when the issuer is not a one-year registrant
at the time of sale.
(2) Registration on Demand
Under section 501, the registration on demand provision, a
stockholder, under certain circumstances, may compel the issuer to
file a registration statement and an offering statement with respect
to the securities that he wishes to sell, provided that he is willing
to pay the expenses of the offering. The purpose of the section is to
permit public sale by a stockholder who did not purchase from the
issuer or otherwise did not protect himself by obtaining a registration covenant from the issuer. Thus, the right to demand registration does not apply "to securities held by a person who executed an
express waiver of his rights under this subsection or who acquired
the securities with knowledge that the person from whom he acquired them or a prior owner had executed such a waiver (except
that knowledge need not be shown if the waiver is noted conspicuously on the securities).""' In addition, the demand for registration

must be accompanied by an opinion of counsel stating that the
proposed offering is subject to the Code's offering statement filing
requirement."'
Once a proper demand for registration is made, two courses of
action are open to the issuer. First, within sixteen months after the
demand the issuer may file an offering statement, together with a
registration statement if it is not already a registrant, and then must
use its best efforts to ensure that the offering statement and any
such registration statement become effective.11 2 Alternatively,
within thirty days after the demand the issuer may make a written
offer to buy the securities that are the subject of the demand.1 The
offer must be at a cash price determined by the issuer to be the fair
value of the securities, and certain other requirements also must be
met.114 The registration on demand procedure is given teeth by sec109. RD 1-3 § 509(f).
110. Id. § 501(b)(6)(A).

111.

Id. § 501.

112.

Id. § 501(b)(1).

113. Id. § 501(b)(6)(C).
114. Id. § 501(b)(7).
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tion 1411, which provides that if the issuer fails without "substantial defense" to effect the filing, the stockholder may obtain
specific performance, damages, or both, and in the event of specific
performance, the issuer may be compelled to pay for the filing.
The concept of registration on demand is analytically and philosophically an important and interesting aspect of the proposed
Code. It represents an attempt to strike a balance between equally
strong but competing policy considerations. Abandonment of the
control concept for the purpose of distinguishing between primary
and secondary distributions will result, as Professor Loss notes, in
"considerable expansion of coverage with respect to secondary distributions.
...5 Accordingly, "without some right to demand
registration, however limited, implementation of that idea might
even create due process problems (at the very least it would be
grossly unfair) in the case of a market buyer who could not have
protected himself by a registration covenant.""' On the other hand,
there is "the principle of corporation law that permits reasonable
restrictions on transfer and the idea that owners of a close corporation should have some control over whether it becomes public as
long as they are careful not to issue shares that are freely transferable.""' 7 Of course, for the company that does not want to be forced
into going public at the demand of a single shareholder, the easy
solution is to offer to buy the shares itself, as contemplated by
section 501(b) (6) (C). This solution, however, is a viable alternative
only if the company happens to have the cash available at the time.
One may question whether it is a healthy development to empower one locked-in stockholder, however unfortunate his predicament, to force an issuer to become a publicly owned company and
enter into the public disclosure process. The legal right to sell securities to the public does not provide any assurance of a strong and
viable market. Further, the absence of a realistic trading market for
securities in which significant investor interest is lacking may end
up disappointing all parties-the seller because no one may purchase his securities and the issuer because of the expense and legal
exposure implicit in the disclosure process. The question arises
whether the proliferation of relatively small publicly owned companies that become such against their will is a good thing for the
115.

TD-1 at xxiv.

116.

Id. § 501, Comment (2).

117. Id.
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United States' securities markets. In recent years our history has
shown that many small companies simply are not suitable for public
ownership, and many managements experience a type of "culture
shock" when they realize the public expectation to which they have
become subject.
V.

THE TRANSACTIONAL EXEMPTIONS

The offering statement and distribution statement requirements apply with respect to'all distributions of a security." 8 A distribution, it will be recalled, is any offering other than a limited offering or a trading transaction. Thus limited offerings and trading
transactions are two of the several transactional exemptions provided by the Code. They are the only two transactional exemptions
that appear in the definitions part of the Code. The other transactional exemptions are set forth in Part V of the Code in sections 511
through 513. The Code's transactional exemptions for the most part
do not differ significantly from the transactional exemptions currently afforded by the 1933 Act and the rules thereunder. Accordingly, the individual exemptions will not be discussed except to note
that the Code's small offering exemption has a base amount of
100,000 dollars."9 Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act authorizes the Commission to exempt from the registration requirements offerings in
amounts up to 500,000 dollars. Pursuant to the authority conferred
by this section, the Commission adopted Regulation A.120 Regulation A exempts from registration offerings in amounts up to 500,000
dollars sold by or on behalf of the issuer or by the estate of a decedent who owned the securities at death. The amount is limited to
100,000 dollars in the case of offerings by other persons. The 100,000
dollar figure contained in section 511(d) of the Code, however, will
not necessarily be the ultimate maximum amount. Comment (1) to
that section states that the Commission could "and presumably
would, as in Reg. A," raise the 100,000 dollar amount pursuant to
the rather broad exemptive authority conferred upon it by section
302 of the Code.'21
VI.

CONCLUSION

In evaluating the issuer registration and distribution provi118. The meaning of "distribution" already has been discussed. See text accompanying
notes 42-57 supra. ".Security" is defined in § 297 of RD 1-3.
119. RD 1-3 § 511(d).
120. 17 C.F.R. 230.251-63 (1976).
121. TD-1 § 511, Comment (1).
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sions, several observations are in order. First, the ultimate formulation of the disclosure and other requirements imposed on issuers and
underwriters is not entirely clear. The significant contours of many
of the key provisions in Parts IV and V of the Code are left to the
rulemaking process of the Commission. This broad discretion vested
in the Commission, though perhaps advisable in view of the current
rethinking of the proper role and scope of disclosure, as a practical
matter will expand the Commission's authority in these areas. Secondly, during the period of drafting the Code, the Congress and the
Commission both have been active in the process of codification and
reform-especially, in the case of the Commission, in accelerating
the process of integration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.122
Although certain areas in the present statutory and regulatory
firmament continue to harbor mystery and doubt, the passage of
time and the efforts of the Commission to fill in the interstices have
produced a system with which most securities lawyers, underwriters, and issuers are fairly comfortable. To reach this stage has
required a tremendous proliferation of regulations, no-action letters,
guidelines, and similar writing, which comprise the body of authority applicable to the registration and distribution of securities.
Adoption of the Code, however, will not reduce the Commission's
burden since the need for such regulations and guidelines to flesh
out the extremely broad and vague standards of the Code will continue. The potential advantage of the Code lies in its completion of
the integration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and in its creation of a new
statutory basis for the development of the law in the future. This is
all to the good and should be encouraged, subject to the caveat that
we will be writing on a clean slate so far as the underlying statutes
are concerned. Old learning and interpretations no longer may
apply, and a period of judicial construction and development probably will be necessary. The possible resulting uncertainty in the future interpretation and development of the new language introduced by the Code is the price that must be paid, at times, for
progress. The bar and the public are indebted deeply to the Reporter
for the Code, Professor Louis Loss, for his tireless dedication to the
process of examining the securities laws and for his rethinking of
their basic concepts. During the years of his efforts many of his
ideas, shared freely with the profession and the SEC, were snatched
up and adopted by regulatory and legislative action. These ideas
already are serving the needs of the expanding and dynamic securi122.

See note 15 supra.
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ties market. Professor Loss's many contributions to the development of the securities laws are enhanced further by the scholarship,
sweep, and, yes, boldness of the concept of the Code, which only he
even could begin to approach as a realistic project.

